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INTRODUCTION 
 
“Neither a borrower, nor a lender be,”1 warned Shakespeare, but 
borrowing and lending is now a robust and lucrative industry within our 
modern economy. Yet even today, powerful lenders must be kept under 
the close watch of state and federal regulators in order to protect the 
inexperienced borrower. This Note analyzes the Helping Families Save 
Their Homes Act of 2009 (hereinafter “Homes Act”),2 which amends 
the Truth in Lending Act of 1968 (hereinafter “TILA”),3 to create a safe 
harbor from liability for servicers in connection with entering mortgage 
loan modifications and other loss mitigation plans. The Homes Act also 
amends the Hope for Homeowners4 program by attempting to provide 
greater incentives to mortgage servicers to modify existing mortgages 
instead of resorting to foreclosure. Further, it creates a new disclosure 
requirement that must be provided to borrowers by purchasers and 
assignees of residential mortgages in the secondary mortgage market. 
Since 2007, over two million families have lost their homes, and 
studies show that many more millions will lose theirs over the next 
several years.5 Even though the crisis has impacted all people across the 
United States, Hispanic and African-American communities have been 
considered the “ground zero” of this economic catastrophe, and this 
problem is coupled with the fact that minorities have generally suffered 
the greatest job losses as well.6 Although Congress and the mortgage 
servicing industry have attempted loan modification reform in the past, 
many of these efforts have not produced effective results.7 As part of a 
 
1 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 1, sc. 3.    
2 Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, 123 Stat. 1632.  
3 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2010).   
4 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-23 (2009).   
5 ROD DUBITSKY ET AL, CREDIT SUISSE, FORECLOSURE UPDATE: OVER 8 MILLION 
FORECLOSURES EXPECTED 1 (2008); About IFLA, INST. FOR FORECLOSURE LEGAL 
ASSISTANCE, http://www.foreclosurelegalassistance.org/about (last visited Oct. 25, 2010).    
6 Conor Dougherty & Miriam Jordan, Recession Hits Immigrants Hard, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 23, 2009, at A10; Michael Powell & Janet Roberts, Minorities Affected Most as New 
York Foreclosures Rise, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2009, at A1.  
7 PENN INST. FOR URBAN RESEARCH, RETOOLING HUD FOR A CATALYTIC FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT: A REPORT TO SECRETARY SHAUN DONOVAN 15 (2009) [hereinafter 
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multi-pronged approach to combat the foreclosure crisis, the Homes Act 
adds incentives and extra pressures to encourage mortgage servicers to 
modify loans, instead of foreclosing on residential property. These 
provisions involve protecting servicers from TILA liability if they enter 
into “qualified loss mitigation plans” with homeowners, creating 
additional TILA disclosure requirements to increase transparency in the 
secondary mortgage market, and offering payments to servicers if they 
refinance mortgages in cooperation with the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (hereinafter “HUD”) through the Hope for 
Homeowners program. A judicial approach to the foreclosure crisis is 
also important, but in passing this bill Congress rejected Senator Dick 
Durbin’s proposed amendments to the Bankruptcy Code that would 
have allowed U.S. Bankruptcy Judges to modify residential mortgages 
in the face of impending foreclosure.8 
It is critical for the federal government and mortgage industry to 
follow through with this legislation that increases consumer ability to 
modify home mortgages, in addition to promoting potential judicial 
mortgage modification authority, in order to stabilize the U.S. housing 
market. Other strategies for mitigating the foreclosure crisis include 
promoting the spread of financial information, making significant 
improvements to the standard mortgage contract, and developing new 
financial consumer products to reduce the strain upon homeowners who 
face periods of financial distress. 
This Note starts by addressing the background of the U.S. home 
mortgage crisis that began in the latter half of 2007, and continues as of 
the date of this publication. There follows an examination of a few of 
the major types of mortgages that exist today, some important past 
legislation regarding home mortgage lending, and previous failed 
attempts at reform. Next, this Note analyzes the Homes Act to see if it 
offers a better source of reform, and compares it to a piece of parallel 
state legislation from New Jersey. This Note concludes by 
recommending other avenues for home mortgage modification and 
reform, including the potential for judicial modification via bankruptcy 
court, and modern pro-consumer financial products that might alleviate 
the distressful situation affecting millions of Americans today. 
 
RETOOLING HUD]; About IFLA, supra note 5. 
8 155 CONG. REC. S4915, 4917-4918 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 2009) (statement of Sen. Dick 
Durbin).   
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I.  BACKGROUND OF THE HOME MORTGAGE CRISIS 
It is a scary thought that, as a result of foreclosure, one woman, 
Sheri West, lived out of her car and used her old backyard as a toilet.9 
As a result of significant high-interest credit card spending, West and 
her husband (now ex-husband), of Cleveland, Ohio, were left with a 
sizeable mortgage on their home despite many years of timely 
payments.10 Because both she and her ex-husband held jobs, she could 
not continue payments on her single salary after her divorce, and instead 
accepted a cash payment of $2500 from the mortgage company to move 
out of the house she lived in for nearly ten years.11 Though forced to 
move between friends’ and relatives’ homes, homeless shelters, and her 
car, she still “want[s] to eventually own a house again. . . .That’s the 
American dream. That’s what everybody wants.”12 
Two schoolteachers in San Diego, California only expect to make 
payments on their “interest-only” mortgage until 2013, at which time 
the monthly payments will increase by 20%.13 This type of home 
mortgage allows homeowners to pay only interest for the first ten years, 
but the principal must be paid off in the next twenty years (instead of 
the usual thirty), resulting in a higher monthly payment during the 
principal payment period.14 The schoolteachers decided to cut out home 
repairs in order to reduce their spending, as they search for a way to 
modify the terms of their mortgage agreement.15 
In some of the country’s weakest economic communities, such as 
Newark, New Jersey, over 1800 homes were in foreclosure by late 
2008, mainly as a result of a 60% subprime mortgage rate in the city.16 
Minority consumers in low-income areas, like most Newark residents, 
often have severely restricted access to home loans at affordable prices 
 
9 Peter S. Goodman, Foreclosures Force Ex-Homeowners to Turn to Shelters, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 19, 2009, at A1.  
10 Id.  
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 David Streitfeld, As an Exotic Mortgage Resets, Payments Skyrocket, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sep. 9, 2009, at B1.   
14 Id.   
15 Id. 
16 Jeffery C. Mays, Boarded-Up and Foreclosed, Houses Await Action by Newark and 
Partners, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2009, at NJ13.   
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with beneficial terms.17 Instead, mortgages offered to “lower-income 
and credit-impaired borrowers have higher interest rates and less 
favorable terms than the conventional prime loans that serve the 
mainstream market.”18 The dearth of easily accessible financial 
information in these communities, in addition to most residents’ general 
lack of financial sophistication, may cause minority borrowers to 
depend on local mortgage brokers, instead of shopping for lower-cost 
loans or using cheaper, internet-based institutions.19 Part of this Note 
will address the fact that certain minority groups, which have lower 
financial literacy skills and decreased access to consumer education, 
often obtain less-favorable subprime loans.20 
From 1997 to 2005, homeownership rates in the United States 
steadily increased for all age, racial, and income groups and geographic 
regions.21 The largest increases in homeownership rates were among 
people aged thirty-five and under with below-median income, and also 
among Hispanics and African Americans.22 The three-fold combination 
of aggressive mortgage lenders, home value appraisers, and complacent 
borrowers initiated the chain reaction leading to the home mortgage 
crisis.23 Mortgage originators sold off loans to securitizers, and therefore 
stopped worrying about the great risks involved with indigent 
borrowers. Furthermore, these originators made virtually no effort to 
determine borrowers’ ability to repay the loans and rarely verified 
borrowers’ income with the IRS, even if they had signed the 
authorization forms.24 
Such questionable tactics may have also had a subtle 
discriminatory component that created a disproportionately negative 
 
17 William Agpar & Allegra Calder, The Dual Mortgage Market: The Persistence of 
Discrimination in Mortgage Lending, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY: RACE AND 
HOUSING CHOICE IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA 102 (Xavier De Souza Briggs, ed., 2005). 
18 Id. 
19 FURMAN CTR. FOR REAL ESTATE AND URBAN POLICY, N.Y.U. SCHOOL OF LAW, THE 
HIGH COST OF SEGREGATION: EXPLORING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RACIAL SEGREGATION 
AND SUBPRIME LENDING 3 (2009).   
20 Id.   
21 ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION: HOW TODAY’S GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
CRISIS HAPPENED, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 5 (2008).   
22 Id.   
23 Id. at 6. 
24 Id.    
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impact on minority homeowners and their communities,25 as noted by a 
racial gap between white and minority borrowers in the home mortgage 
market.26 In 2001, lending at prime rates accounted for approximately 
75% of all home mortgage lending to whites, but less than 50% of 
lending to Hispanics, and only 40% of lending to African Americans.27 
As a result of such lending practices, certain groups were forced to the 
subprime markets. Thereafter, homes are lost because of poor or 
unreasonable mortgage terms, credit is crippled, the chances of 
receiving a future home loan decrease, and the cost of credit for other 
important purposes increases.28 The foreclosed homes remain vacant for 
long periods of time and become targets for criminal activity, thereby 
discouraging families or new businesses from moving into the 
community.29 In an area like Newark, where there is already a long 
history of community instability, high foreclosure rates further 
stigmatize the city and its residents.30 
 A.  Types of Home Mortgages in the U.S. and Delinquency Rates 
There are three primary types of home mortgages, and this 
categorization relates to the final investor in the mortgage.31 The first 
type is a note held in a bank or thrift portfolio, where mortgage holders 
have an undivided interest in the notes, giving them a significant 
amount of freedom to modify mortgages to meet a homeowner’s 
financial situation.32 Because these entities own the mortgages and 
therefore have a direct financial interest in avoiding foreclosure, they 
are in the best position to identify potential solutions, such as loan 
principal reduction and efficient refinancing strategies.33 However, a 
bank or portfolio’s disincentive to modification is the immediate write-
down of value in these assets, resulting in a reduction of net income for 
 
25 Agpar, supra note 17, at 111.   
26 Id. at 109.   
27 Id.   
28 Id. at 118.   
29 Id.; Mays, supra note 16. 
30 Agpar, supra note 17, at 118; Mays, supra note 16; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 46:10B-37(h) (2008). 
31 RETOOLING HUD, supra note 7, at 20. 
32 Id. 
33 Id.  
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the mortgage holder.34 This category of mortgages comprises 
approximately 27% of all outstanding mortgage debt and has a 10% 
delinquency rate.35 
The second type of home mortgages are those held by the Federal 
National Mortgage Association (hereinafter “FannieMae”) and the 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (hereinafter “FreddieMac”), 
two government sponsored enterprises.36 As a result of the Treasury 
Department’s intervention in September 2008, the federal government 
effectively operates these two home loan entities and may be in a 
favorable position to initiate creative solutions to deal with the 
mortgage crisis.37 This category of mortgages comprises approximately 
51% of single-family mortgages nationwide, and carries a 17% 
delinquency rate.38 
The last major category of home mortgage are those held in private 
label securities (hereinafter “PLS”).39 These mortgages, most originated 
as subprime or through Alt-A terms,40 have been sold into private 
securitization trusts, and are the most difficult to address because they 
are bundled together in private securities.41 Further problems arise 
because potential solutions have been complicated by recent litigation,42 
such as Greenwich Financial Services Distressed Mortgage Fund 3, 
LLC v. Countrywide Financial Corp.,43 discussed infra. This category of 
mortgages consists of only about 16% of outstanding mortgage debt, but 
has a staggering 58% “serious delinquenc[y rate].”44 
 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id.  
37 RETOOLING HUD, supra note 7, at 20. 
38 Id.  
39 Id. 
40 Alt-A mortgage loans are somewhat risky mortgages where a borrower is unable to 
provide “complete documentation of his assets or the amount or source of his income.” 
MARK ADELSON, NOMURA FIXED INCOME RESEARCH, A JOURNEY TO THE ALT-A ZONE 1-2 
(2003), available at http://www.securitization.net/pdf/nomura_journey_060303.pdf. In 
addition to this typical Alt-A attribute, Alt-A loan pools include loans classified as 
“subprime.” Id. at 3. The usual subprime borrower has either been delinquent on housing 
payments at least annually, or has a FICO score lower than 620. Id.  
41 RETOOLING HUD, supra note 7, at 20. 
42 Id. 
43 Greenwich Fin. Servs. Distressed Mortg. Fund 3, LLC v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 
654 F. Supp. 2d 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), appeal dismissed, 603 F.3d 23 (2d Cir. 2010).  
44 RETOOLING HUD, supra note 7, at 20. 
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Because the securitization transactions in the PLS home mortgage 
context are complex, some explanation is necessary for a basic 
understanding. If a financial institution owns a group of mortgages, 
which it either entered into itself or bought from another institution, it 
can sell them to a trust.45 The trust issues bonds to pay for the 
mortgages, called mortgage-backed securities (hereinafter “MBS”), and 
these bonds are backed by the loans now owned by the trust.46 The trust 
holds the loans, placing them far from the original institution’s 
creditors, and a third-party loan servicer manages the loans for “the 
benefit of the MBS holders.”47 The servicer, usually a corporate 
subsidiary of the mortgage originator, collects payments from 
homeowners, handles paperwork, sells properties in the event of 
foreclosure, and entertains mortgage modification requests.48 The 
contract between the servicer and the trust is called a pooling and 
servicing agreement and usually includes limits on modifying 
mortgages that are in or near default.49 
II. BACKGROUND OF HOME MORTGAGE-RELATED 
LEGISLATION 
A. The Truth in Lending Act 
Enacted in 1968, the purpose of the TILA is to promote the 
“informed use of credit” by consumers.50 The statute is intended to 
provide consumers with “a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that 
the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit 
terms available to him.”51 The 1967 Committee Reports explained that 
requiring creditors to consistently and uniformly disclose credit 
information, by requiring the inclusion of all mandatory charges in the 
 
45 Helping Families Save Their Homes in Bankruptcy Act of 2009: Hearing on H.R. 200 
and H.R. 225 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 46 (2009) (written 
testimony of Adam J. Levitin, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law 
Center), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_ 
house_hearings&docid=f:46615.pdf.  
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 46-47.  
48 Id. at 47. 
49 Id. 
50 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2010).   
51 Id.     
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calculation of the percentage rate, would give consumers the 
information needed to make an informed decision on using and 
comparing credit rates and costs.52 Thus, the original focus of TILA was 
on the cost of credit. 
William T. Cahill, a Republican congressman from New Jersey 
(and former New Jersey Governor) proposed the home mortgage 
amendments to TILA, which were included in the bill without further 
debate.53 These amendments were primarily intended to prevent 
homeowners from being victims of “vicious secondary mortgage 
schemes.”54 Representative Cahill explained that “in many cases [a 
homeowner entering into a consumer credit transaction] is never 
informed nor aware that his home is being made subject to a 
mortgage.”55 The amendments, accepted by the Senate and adopted in 
the final version of TILA, require creditors to disclose that they are 
holding a security interest in the debtor’s home.56 The amendments set 
forth a three-pronged approach to regulate the secondary mortgage 
market. First, they “require a 3-day waiting period before a second 
mortgage transaction can be completed.”57 Second, they require 
disclosure that the credit is secured by a mortgage on the residence.58  
Lastly, the amendments enlarge consumers’ legal rights when 
purchasing mortgages from an original home improvement contractor.59 
B. The Helping Families Save Their Homes Act 
The Homes Act was signed into law by President Barack Obama 
on May 20, 2009.60 Two major elements comprise this Act. First, it 
amends the Housing Act of 1949 to require mortgagees, upon either 
actual or imminent default of a guaranteed mortgage, to participate in 
 
52 H.R. REP. NO. 90-1040, at 13 (1967); S. REP. NO. 90-392, at 3 (1967).   
53 Anderson Bros. Ford v. Valencia, 452 U.S. 205, 220 (1981). 
54 114 CONG. REC. 1611 (1968) (statement of Rep, Cahill). 
55 Id.   
56 Anderson Bros. Ford, 452 U.S. at 221-22. 
57 114 CONG. REC. 5024 (1968).   
58 Id.     
59 Id.     
60 Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Reforms for American 
Homeowners and Consumers (May 20, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/reforms-for-american-homeowners-and-
consumers-president-obama-signs-the-helping-families-save-their-homes-act-and-the-fraud-
enforcement-and-recovery-act.    
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loss mitigation instead of foreclosure.61 The Act also permits the HUD 
Secretary to: (a) “authorize the modification of mortgages;” and (b) 
establish a program for payment of a partial claim to a mortgagee who 
agrees to apply the claim amount to payment of a mortgage on a 1- to 4-
family residence.62 The Act also allows the Secretary to: (a) “authorize 
compensation to the mortgagee for lost income on monthly mortgage 
payments due to interest rate reduction;” (b) reimburse the mortgagee 
from a guaranty fund in connection with “activities that the mortgagee 
is required to undertake concerning repayment by the mortgagor of the 
amount owed” to HUD; (c) “authorize payments to the mortgagee on 
behalf of the borrower,” under terms defined by HUD; and (d) authorize 
mortgage modification “with terms extended up to 40 years. . .” from 
the modification date.63 Lastly, the Act also imparts the Secretary with 
the authority to assign to HUD a guaranteed mortgage on a family 
residence presently defaulting or facing imminent default, and 
prescribes procedures for HUD for payment of guarantee, disposition, 
and loan servicing.64 
The second element of the Homes Act is its four major changes to 
TILA. First, the Act alters the TILA fiduciary duty requirements for 
servicers of pooled residential mortgages. Under the Act, any residential 
mortgage servicer that enters into “qualified loss mitigation plans” for 
mortgages that originated before the date of enactment of the Homes 
Act (including securitized or “bundled” mortgages), must honor these 
new fiduciary duty obligations that result as a matter of entering into a 
mortgage modification plan.65 Second, the Act protects servicers from 
any liability if the servicer is determined to be acting in the best 
interests of all other investors and parties, and indicates that such 
servicers will not be subject to equitable liability based solely upon the 
execution of a “qualified loss mitigation plan.”66 Third, the Act states 
that any person, including a trustee, issuer, or loan originator, will not 
be liable for money damages or be subject to any equitable relief, based 
solely upon that person’s cooperation with a servicer in implementing 
 
61 Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, 123 Stat. 1632. 
62 Id. at § 101.   
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at § 129.   
66 Id. 
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such a plan.67 Lastly, the Act imposes liability upon a servicer (including 
a trustee, issuer, or loan originator) for actual fraud in the origination or 
servicing of a loan, in the implementation of a “qualified loss mitigation 
plan,” or for violating any state or federal predatory lending law that 
regulates home mortgages.68 Typical predatory lending practices include 
deceitful loan agreements, fraud, influencing borrowers through 
deceptive sales presentations, and abusing consumers’ lack of 
understanding of contract terms.69 The actors involved in predatory 
lending schemes can include mortgage brokers, bankers, realtors, 
appraisers, home improvement contractors, and any others directly or 
indirectly involved in the lending process.70 
III.  PAST ATTEMPTS AT HOME MORTGAGE REFORM AND 
WHY THEY FAILED 
A. Hope Now 
Hope Now is “an alliance between counselors, mortgage 
companies, investors, and other mortgage market participants,” whose 
mission is to organize “outreach efforts to help homeowners in distress 
to help them stay in their homes, and. . .create a unified, coordinated 
plan to reach and help as many homeowners as possible.”71 The program 
began in October 2007, in the face of the mortgage crisis, through a 
joint effort between the Treasury Department and HUD.72 Essentially, 
Hope Now is an unfunded government-organized network of industry 
participants who assist delinquent, or soon to be delinquent, borrowers 
in modifying the terms of their mortgage, or setting up alternative 
payment plans.73 However, Hope Now’s Executive Director, Faith 
 
67 Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, §129 123 Stat. 
1632, 1639.  
68 Id. 
69 Agpar, supra note 17, at 101 n.1.   
70 Id.   
71 Are You Eligible?, HOPE NOW, http://www.hopenow.com/hopenow-aboutus.php (last 
visited Oct. 25, 2010).   
72 Press Release, Hope Now, Hope Now Alliance Created to Help Distressed 
Homeowners (Oct. 10, 2007), available at http://www.fsround.org/media/pdfs/ 
AllianceRelease.pdf.   
73 SHILLER, supra note 21, at 112; Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Treasury Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of 
the Treasury, Remarks before the New York Society of Securities Analysts (Jan. 7, 2008), 
available at http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/hp757.htm.  
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Schwartz, was also an executive at Option One Mortgage — a subprime 
lender — at the time of her appointment to Hope Now.74 Many industry 
participants in the program oppose such government intervention, which 
would modify mortgages and create losses for their companies.75 
Irrespective of the shaky foundations of Hope Now, it has never 
provided relief to distressed homeowners. The program claimed to have 
helped 2.7 million borrowers as of October 2008, including 1.6 million 
homeowners with subprime loans; however, less than 20% of those 
mortgage modifications actually resulted in a lower monthly payment.76 
In the face of a serious mortgage crisis, a telephone hotline to credit 
counselors — funded by private banks or mortgage companies — was a 
weak effort to provide assistance to homeowners; it is generally 
considered a failed program. 
B. Hope for Homeowners Program 
Hope for Homeowners was established by Congress in July 2008, 
authorizing the Federal Housing Administration (hereinafter “FHA”) to 
insure refinanced distressed mortgages.77 It was intended to help 
approximately 400,000 homeowners with problematic mortgages, but as 
of February 2009, only twenty-five of 451 loan applications have 
successfully closed.78 Mortgage servicers screen borrowers for the 
program after they qualify for a trial mortgage modification.79 If 
borrowers qualify, they can then refinance their mortgage into a new 
loan through the FHA, while the mortgage investors take a write-down 
 
74 Option One Executive Faith Schwartz Named to Federal Reserve Board’s Consumer 
Advisory Council, BUSINESS WIRE, Jan. 24, 2006, http://www.allbusiness.com/banking-
finance/banking-lending-credit-services/5388745-1.html.   
75 Lynnley Browning, Distressed Owners Are Frustrated by Aid Group, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 2, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/02/business/02hope.html.    
76 Helping Families Save Their Homes in Bankruptcy Act of 2009, supra note 45, at 44; 
SONIA GARRISON ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, CONTINUED DECAY AND SHAKY 
REPAIRS: THE STATE OF SUBPRIME LOANS TODAY 7-8 (2009). 
77 Hope for Homeowners Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C. § 1709 (2009).   
78 Brian Naylor, Homeowners Rescue Program Shows Slim Benefits, NPR (Feb. 3, 
2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=100163398. As of September 
2009, Hope for Homeowners has only helped ninety-five borrowers move into government-
backed mortgages. Jessica Holzer, Talks Stall on Mortgage Program, WALL ST. J., Sep. 23, 
2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125373881952135221.html.    
79 Tara Siegel Bernard, Slow Start to U.S. Plan for Modifying Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 13, 2009, at B1.   
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loss on their investment, and the government insures the new loan.80 The 
main pitfall of the Hope for Homeowners program is that it requires 
banks or other investors in mortgages to take a loss by writing down the 
mortgage so that the borrower can receive a new government-backed 
mortgage. Thus, there is no real benefit to a mortgage holder for 
offering assistance to the financially strapped homeowner. As a 
consequence, it has shown little progress in reducing foreclosures. 
C. FHA Secure Program 
The FHA Secure program, starting in August 2007, offered 
refinancing for homeowners with non-FHA adjustable rate mortgages, 
including those with negative equity, into FHA fixed-rate mortgages, 
and was predicted to help approximately 240,000 homeowners.81 
However, the program helped only a few thousand delinquent 
borrowers refinance before being terminated at the end of 2008.82 
Senator Christopher Dodd, Chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, 
explained that “while a good idea, [the program was] not addressing the 
magnitude of the problem” because it failed to help those homeowners 
with serious threats of impending foreclosure, instead helping those 
borrowers who made their payments on time but requested government 
help before encountering more serious financial difficulties.83 The 
program ended in December 2008 because of the negative impact on the 
FHA’s Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund; a letter to current borrowers 
explained that maintaining the program would have required loan 
premium increases or a total discontinuation of the FHA’s Single-
Family Insurance Program.84 
 
80 Id.   
81 Press Release, Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., Bush Administration to Help Nearly 
One-Quarter of a Million Homeowners Refinance, Keep Their Homes (Aug. 31, 2007), 
available at http://www.hud.gov/news/release.cfm?content=pr07-123.cfm.   
82 Michael Corkery, Mortgage ‘Cram-Downs’ Loom as Foreclosures Mount, WALL ST. 
J., Dec. 31, 2008, at C1.  
83 Rachel L. Swarns, Federal Mortgage Plan Falls Short, Critics Say, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
30, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/30/business/30fha.html.   
84 Letter from Brian D. Montgomery, Assistant Sec’y for Hous., Fed. Hous. Comm’r, to 
All Approved Mortgagees (Dec. 19, 2008) (on file with author).   
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IV.  THE HOMES ACT OF 2009: EFFECTS ON OTHER 
PROGRAMS, LEGISLATION AND NEW INITIATIVES 
A. Amendments to Hope for Homeowners 
The Homes Act amended Hope for Homeowners to increase the 
affordability of mortgage modifications for borrowers. First, it permits 
reduction of the Hope for Homeowners up-front 3% fee to “up to 3%,” 
and the exit fee may be reduced from 1.5% to “not more than 1.5%,” 
thereby giving HUD the ability to lower the annual insurance premium 
fees on refinanced loans.85 Second, the amendments provide financial 
incentives for mortgage servicers to utilize refinancing through Hope 
for Homeowners by permitting HUD to redistribute any property sale 
profits, up to 50% of the appreciation, to any senior mortgage holders.86 
Third, the Act makes Hope for Homeowners program requirements 
more consistent with standard FHA practices, thereby reducing the 
levels of confusing bureaucracy between the two entities.87 As a result, 
all documents, forms and procedures for insuring mortgages under 
Hope for Homeowners are the same as those for mortgages insured by 
the regular FHA Single-Family Insurance Program.88 Fourth, the Act 
moves administration of the program from the Board of Directors of the 
Program to the HUD Secretary, placing the Board in a more advisory 
role,89 and providing the program with more resources and a dedicated 
staff within HUD. The Board consists of the Treasury Secretary, HUD 
Secretary, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board and the Chairman 
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Company.90 
Although these amendments increase the affordability of 
refinancing through Hope for Homeowners, and create financial 
 
85 Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, § 202, 123 
Stat. 1632, 1642.     
86 Id.   
87 Id.; Preserving Home Ownership: Progress Needed to Prevent Foreclosures: 
Hearing Before the Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 198-202 
(2009) (prepared statement of Allen H. Jones, Default Management Policy Executive, Bank 
of America), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 
111_senate_hearings&docid=f:55032.pdf.  
88 Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009 § 102. 
89 Id.   
90 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., Bush Administration Announces 
Flexibility for “Hope For Homeowners” Program (Nov. 19, 2008), available at 
http://www.hud.gov/news/release.cfm?content=pr08-178.cfm.   
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incentives for lenders to utilize this program, there are many critics who 
feel the changes do not go far enough to limit the number of 
foreclosures. One major issue is that the incentives are servicer-based 
rather than providing borrowers with direct financial assistance.91 Those 
servicer incentives, usually an initial percentage of the loan and a future 
payment based on any appreciated property value, are not even 
considered incentives to mortgage industry insiders.92 These percentage 
fees are considered to be too low to encourage active participation in 
Hope for Homeowners because the program requires a mortgage holder 
to fully release the borrower from indebtedness.93 As a result, only those 
mortgages in serious risk of foreclosure are given over to the program 
since the mortgage holders have nothing else to lose.94 The program also 
does not address homeowners who are currently unemployed and 
cannot make any payments,95 a common situation that shows little 
potential for mortgage modification from servicers or investors.96 
B. Amendments to TILA 
The Homes Act also makes amendments to Section 129A of TILA, 
which was originally enacted by the Housing and Economic Recovery 
Act of 2008,97 to provide residential mortgage servicers with a safe 
harbor from liability in connection with entering “qualified loss 
mitigation plans” with borrowers.98 This safe harbor is extended to 
trustees, issuers, and loan originators when they cooperate with the 
servicer in the implementation of a qualified loss mitigation plan.99 The 
 
91 Adam Weinstein, Congress Mulls Radical Changes for Servicers, Lenders to Add 
Help for Homeowners, DEFAULT SERVICING NEWS, Sept. 10, 2009, http://www.dsnews.com 
/articles/congress-mulls-radical-changes-for-servicers-lenders-to-add-help-homeowners-
2009-09-10.   
92 Letter from John A. Courson, President and CEO, Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, to 
Regulations Div., HUD (Mar. 9, 2009), available at http://www.mortgagebankers.org 
/files/AU/2009/MBACommentLetter_H4H_3-9-2009.pdf.   
93 Id.   
94 Jessica Holzer, Talks Stall on Mortgage Program, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 2009, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125373881952135221.html.   
95 Weinstein, supra note 91. 
96 Steven Greenhouse, 65 and Up and Looking for Work, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2009, at 
B1.   
97 Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654. 
98 Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, §201, 123 Stat. 
1632, 1638. 
99 Id. A “qualified loss mitigation plan” is defined in the Act as being either “a 
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amended Section 129A states that whenever a servicer of residential 
mortgages agrees to enter into a qualified loss mitigation plan with 
respect to one or more residential mortgages that originated before the 
date of enactment of the Homes Act, including mortgages held in 
securitization or other investment vehicles, the servicer’s fiduciary duty 
to maximize the net present value of the mortgages will be “construed 
to apply to all such investors and parties, and not to any individual party 
or group of parties.”100 The servicer satisfies this duty if the servicer 
implements a qualified loss mitigation plan that meets the following 
criteria: (i) a default on payments has occurred, is imminent, or is 
reasonably foreseeable; (ii) a mortgagee occupies the property securing 
the mortgage as his or her principal residence; and (iii) the servicer 
reasonably determined that the application of a qualified loss mitigation 
plan will likely provide an anticipated recovery on the outstanding 
principal mortgage debt that would exceed recovery through 
foreclosure.101 The safe harbor provision kicks in at this point, and a 
servicer deemed to be acting in the best interests of all parties will not 
be liable to any party based solely on the implementation of the 
qualified loss mitigation plan.102 Furthermore, no person, including a 
trustee, issuer or loan originator, will be liable for money damages or be 
subject to an injunction based solely upon the cooperation of that person 
with servicer in order to implement the qualified loss mitigation plan.103 
The Homes Act’s second major amendment to TILA is the 
addition of a disclosure requirement.104 Within thirty days after a 
mortgage is sold or transferred to a third party, the creditor (the new 
owner or assignee of the mortgage) must notify the borrower in writing 
of (a) the identity and contact information of the new creditor, (b) the 
date of transfer, (c) a way to reach the new creditor’s agent, (d) the 
 
refinancing of a mortgage under the Hope for Homeowners program” and/or “a residential 
loan modification, workout, or other loss mitigation plan, including to the extent that the 
Secretary of the Treasury determines appropriate, a loan sale, real property disposition, trial 
modification, pre-foreclosure sale, and deed in lieu of foreclosure, that is described or 
authorized in guidelines issued by the Secretary…under the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 2008; refinancing of a mortgage under the HOPE Program.” Id.  
100 Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, §201, 123 
Stat. 1632, 1638 (emphasis added). 
101 Id.   
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at § 404. 
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location where the transfer of mortgage ownership is recorded, and (e) 
any other relevant information regarding the new creditor.105 
Additionally, this amendment includes a provision giving borrowers a 
private right of action against the new creditor for non-compliance with 
this new disclosure requirement.106 These remedies are in addition to 
attorney’s fees for successful litigants, which were already available 
under TILA.107 
These two amendments may encourage mortgage servicers to 
reduce foreclosures by providing a modification plan for borrowers. The 
safe harbor provision gives lenders that enter into qualified loss 
mitigation plans with borrowers an extra level of liability protection 
from both secondary investors in a securitized mortgage fund and the 
borrowers themselves.108 The Act’s definition for a qualified loss 
mitigation plan is quite broad as well, giving lenders a wide variety of 
options to help distressed homeowners.109 In addition, element (ii), 
requiring that a borrower occupy the property securing the mortgage as 
his or her principal residence, ensures that only needy individuals, not 
those with several homes, are capable of receiving assistance from a 
mortgage servicer through this plan. 
The new secondary mortgage market disclosure requirements 
mainly benefit consumers. Under this provision, borrowers must be 
provided with extensive contact details for secondary investors, 
enabling these borrowers to communicate their concerns more 
effectively in the event of late payments, foreclosure worries, or their 
family’s changing financial situation. The threat of a private right of 
action by the consumer may also be a considerable tool for compliance 
against the secondary market investors. 
From the borrower’s perspective, there are no real downsides to 
these two TILA amendments. However, the amendments may generate 
 
105 Id. 
106 Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, §404, 123 
Stat. 1632, 1658. Consumers are able to recover actual damages, as well as maximum 
statutory damages of $4000 in an individual action, or the lesser of $500,000 or 1% of a 
creditor’s net worth in a class action. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (2010).  
107 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3); Purtle v. Eldridge Auto Sales, Inc., 91 F.3d 797, 799-800 
(6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1252 (1997).   
108 Gretchen Morgenson, A Reality Check on Mortgage Modification, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
25, 2009, at BU1.   
109 Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, §201 123 
Stat. 1632, 1639. 
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problems for investors in securitized mortgage funds, because investors 
will only be able to assert claims against servicers who modify loans 
when an express contractual provision in the “pooling and servicing 
agreement” expressly prohibits loan modification.110 Investors in funds 
without these agreements will be unable to impose liability on a servicer 
if that servicer chooses to enter into a qualified loss mitigation plan with 
a homeowner. 
The other main problem with the new disclosure requirement is 
administrative in nature. New mortgage servicers are already required to 
send out servicing transfer statements under the federal Real Estate 
Settlement Procedures Act when they assign, sell or transfer a mortgage 
to another lender or servicer.111 Still, the Homes Act’s updated 
disclosure requirement introduces an extra level of transparency into the 
secondary mortgage market, and increases risks of litigation against 
primary and interim purchasers of loans. This litigation risk is most 
likely a signal from Congress to the secondary mortgage industry to 
acknowledge that their investments depend on a real person, the 
homeowner, and so they should work with the borrower to create a 
payment plan instead of choosing foreclosure. 
V.  COMPARISON WITH THE SAVE NEW JERSEY HOMES 
ACT OF 2008 
Although the home mortgage crisis caused economic disruption 
across the United States, the home mortgage crisis deeply affected the 
State of New Jersey in particular.112 In 2008, the rate of foreclosures in 
New Jersey rose from one in every 265 homes to one in every 201 
homes.113 On a national scale in 2008, the rate of foreclosure was one in 
every 171 homes.114 In response to this growing concern in the State and 
throughout the nation, Governor Jon Corzine signed the Save New 
Jersey Homes Act of 2008 on September 15, 2008, and it remains in 
effect until January 1, 2011.115 This statute is intended to protect only 
 
110 Morgenson, supra note 108. 
111 12 U.S.C.S. § 2605(a) (LexisNexis 2010). 
112 Kareem Fahim & Janet Roberts, In New Jersey, Dreams of a Better Life Dashed by 
Foreclosure Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2009, at NJ1.   
113 Beth Fitzgerald, Foreclosure Rate Up 140% in the State, Dramatic Increase from 
April to June, THE STAR-LEDGER, July 26, 2008, at 1.   
114 Id.   
115 Save New Jersey Homes Act of 2008, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-40 (West 2008).   
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homeowners who signed introductory rate mortgages116 that had low 
introductory “teaser rates,” which bumped up to a higher rate later in the 
mortgage period and increased the risk of default or foreclosure.117 The 
statute, meant to be construed liberally,118 allows introductory rate 
mortgage borrowers to continue making monthly payments under the 
introductory rate for three additional years, beginning when the higher 
rate would take effect.119 Like the federal Homes Act, the borrower must 
occupy the property as his or her principal residence,120 so a person’s 
vacation home in New Jersey is not eligible for introductory rate 
extension. When the lender begins seriously considering foreclosure on 
a property, it must alert the borrower in a large, bold-printed notice of 
these new rights under the statute.121 This notice packet must include the 
actual form to receive a three-year extension and list any other 
alternatives to foreclosure, such as possible refinancing options.122 This 
entire packet of information must be sent in a detailed envelope 
indicating its contents to the borrower.123 The borrower must submit a 
certification of extension form back to the creditor, which includes: 
(1) the name of the borrower; (2) the address of the property; and (3) 
an affirmative statement that the eligible borrower: (a) does not have 
sufficient monthly income. . .to pay the monthly payments that will 
apply after the date that the interest rate resets; (b) requests the 
 
116 The New Jersey Legislature defined an introductory rate as such:  
(1) an introductory payment rate option that is set at least 3 percent below the 
fully indexed rate at the time the loan was originated and payments may adjust 
by more than 3 percent at the reset date regardless of whether the variable rate 
index has increased; or (2) an interest rate that may adjust by more than 2 
percent at the end of the initial fixed rate period of the loan and which, 
notwithstanding the payment rate in effect, had an interest rate at origination of 
more than 200 basis points over the Freddie Mac 30-year conventional interest 
rate and which provides for an introductory rate that is set below the fully 
indexed rate at the time the loan was originated and may adjust at the reset date 
regardless of whether the variable rate index has increased.  
Id. at § 46:10B-38. 
117 ASSEMBLY FIN. INST. AND INS. COMM., FLOOR STATEMENT, Assemb. 2780, 2008 
Sess., 212th Leg. (N.J. 2008), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us 
/2008/Bills/A3000/2780_S2.PDF.   
118 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-45.   
119 Id. at § 46:10B-40(d). 
120 Id. at § 46:10B-38. 
121 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-41(a)-(c) (West 2008). 
122 Id.  
123 Id. at § 46:10B-45.   
RODGERS (DO NOT DELETE) 12/6/2010  12:01 PM 
2010 MORTGAGE MODIFICATION MELTDOWN 149 
 
period of extension; (c) agrees to continue, during the period of 
extension, monthly payments, which shall include principal and 
interest calculated at the introductory rate. . .as well as amounts for 
taxes, insurance, and any other amounts being paid under the terms 
of the mortgage prior to the interest rate reset; (d) agrees to pay the 
creditor, at the time of the full repayment of the introductory rate 
mortgage, any interest deferred on account of the period of 
extension; (e) agrees to accept the creditor’s. . .modification of 
mortgage on the property to secure the repayment of the interest 
deferred on account of the period of extension; and (f) agrees to sign 
a. . .form that contains the terms of the period of extension and any 
documentation necessary to establish or record the modification of 
mortgage.124 
Any borrower who knowingly makes material misrepresentations 
in this certification is guilty of a fourth degree crime under this statute.125 
Similar to the federal Homes Act, the New Jersey statute also carries 
with it a private right of action for the borrower if a creditor “willfully 
violates any provision of [the] act.”126 
Although there are some comparisons with the federal Homes Act, 
the main difference is that the federal legislation in this area encourages 
loan servicers to make voluntary efforts to encourage mortgage 
modification, while the New Jersey law actually provides for mandatory 
mortgage modification by extending introductory rate periods beyond 
the original contract terms. The response by the mortgage industry to 
this sort of provision was the same refrain used in response to the threat 
of judicial modification through bankruptcy courts: increasing lending 
costs through higher interest rates or down payments to make up for 
legislatively-imposed losses.127 
 
124 Id. at § 46:10B-40(b).   
125 Id. at § 46:10B-40(c). 
126 Id. at § 46:10B-43.   
127 Helping Families Save their Homes in Bankruptcy Act of 2009, supra note 45, at 36 
(testimony of Adam J. Levitin); Michael Corkery, Mortgage ‘Cram-Downs’ Loom as 
Foreclosures Mount, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 2008, at C1. 
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VI.  EFFECT OF THE HOMES ACT AND AVENUES FOR 
ADDITIONAL REFORM 
A. Litigation Impact 
In Greenwich Financial Services Distressed Mortgage Fund 3, 
LLC v. Countrywide Financial Corp.,128 the District Court determined, 
inter alia, that jurisdiction surrounding the Homes Act’s amendments to 
TILA is appropriately found in state, rather than federal, court.129 The 
case involved a dispute between a putative class of plaintiffs, holders of 
mortgage-backed securities, and the defendant loan servicer, 
Countrywide.130 After the housing market plummeted, Countrywide was 
charged with violating predatory lending laws in various states.131 The 
settlement agreement included modifying approximately 400,000 loans, 
and providing over eight billion dollars in relief aid for homeowners 
serviced by the company.132 The plaintiff investors’ portfolio sustained 
considerable losses because of these incidental mortgage modifications, 
and plaintiffs alleged that Countrywide could only modify mortgages 
within the fund after it purchased the mortgages, thereby transferring 
the loss from the investment fund.133 
Countrywide argued that federal jurisdiction was proper because 
(1) under the Class Action Fairness Act (hereinafter “CAFA”) plaintiffs 
sought class action certification, the parties were minimally diverse, and 
the amount in controversy exceeded five million dollars;134 and (2) 
because plaintiffs’ claims introduced substantial federal questions.135 
The investors disagreed, countering that an exception to CAFA 
jurisdiction136 applied, their allegations did not present federal questions, 
 
128 Greenwich Fin. Servs. Distressed Mortg. Fund 3, LLC v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 
654 F. Supp. 2d 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), appeal dismissed, 603 F.3d 23 (2d Cir. 2010). 
Initially the plaintiffs filed suit in New York State Supreme Court, and Countrywide 
removed to the Southern District of New York; the cited opinion concerns the plaintiffs’ 
motion to remand back to state court. Id. at 194.  
129 Id. at 203-04. 
130 Id. at 193. 
131 Id.  
132 Id.; Vikas Bajaj, Fund Investors Sue Countrywide Over Loan Modifications, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 2, 2008, at B8.   
133 Countrywide, 654 F. Supp. 2d at 194. 
134 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A) (West 2005).  
135 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (West 2005).   
136 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(9)(C) (“[D]istrict courts shall [not] have original 
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and Countrywide’s federal defense was insufficient to create subject 
matter jurisdiction.137 Countrywide’s defense raised the issue of the 
Homes Act’s servicer safe harbor amendments,138 discussed infra, and 
assuming that their mortgage modification settlement plan constituted a 
“qualified loss mitigation plan,” then the statutory provisions create a 
federal presumption against liability when servicers modify loans.139 
Under the law, the plaintiff investors bear the burden of overcoming 
that presumption.140 Countrywide argued that because it was the 
plaintiff’s burden, “federal law [was] a necessary element of their claim 
and therefore a federal forum [was] required under Supreme Court 
precedent.”141 
The Court disagreed, explaining that plaintiffs’ claims depended 
only on common law theories of contract interpretation, and 
Countrywide had the burden to show why TILA precluded the 
investors’ claims.142 Countrywide argued that TILA altered the state law 
of contract to require a specific rule of construction for pooling and 
servicing agreements.143 However, the Court disagreed with 
Countrywide’s interpretation of the TILA safe harbor provision.144 It 
concluded instead that regardless of any state law changes, there was no 
evidence that TILA modified the common law cause of action for 
breach of contract.145 
This case is one of the first that clearly demonstrates the potential 
ineffectiveness of the Homes Act. In this instance, it pitted investors in 
mortgage-backed securities against troubled homeowners, leaving the 
loan servicers in the middle armed with limited options.146 Through the 
 
jurisdiction…[over] any class action that solely involves a claim…that relates to the rights, 
duties (including fiduciary duties), and obligations relating to or created by or pursuant to 
any security….”). 
137 Countrywide, 654 F. Supp. 2d at 195. 
138 15 U.S.C. § 1639(a) (2009).   
139 Brief of Defendant at 16, Greenwich Fin. Servs. Distressed Mort. Fund 3, LLC v. 
Countrywide Fin. Corp., 654 F. Supp. 2d 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 08 Civ. 11343). 
140 Id. at 13-14. 
141 Id. at 11-12 (citing Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 
308 (2005)). 
142 Countrywide, 654 F. Supp. 2d at 202-03. 
143 Id.   
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Gretchen Morgenson, Countrywide Loses Ruling in Loan Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 
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Homes Act, Congress has charged mortgage servicers with keeping 
homeowners in their homes by offering monetary incentives, and has 
attempted to limit liability for cooperative servicers who engage in 
good-faith mortgage modification. At the same time, investors are 
losing out because some contracts contain provisions that prohibit such 
modification.147 Granted, the opinion in Countrywide only remands the 
action to state court, at which point a judge may rule that the loan 
servicer’s liability is ultimately shielded by the new safe harbor 
provision, but that is still an open question at this point. In response, 
there should be a clear move by servicing companies and mortgage-
backed investor funds to remove impediments to loan modification. 
Such a move within the mortgage industry would surely benefit 
homeowners because servicers would no longer be threatened with 
lawsuits by their investors, and could therefore more willingly engage in 
mortgage modification procedures. 
B. Bankruptcy Provisions Will Increase Opportunities for 
Mortgage Modification. 
Although the Homes Act aims to help homeowners avoid 
foreclosure, its financial servicer incentives are at odds with pooling and 
servicing agreements between servicers and investors of mortgage-
backed securities. These pooling and servicing agreements limit the 
ability of servicers to engage in mortgage modification, making it nearly 
impossible for servicers to operate within the current version of the 
Homes Act.148 One significant proposal that did not make it to the final 
version of the statute granted authority to the U.S. Bankruptcy Courts to 
modify residential mortgage agreements.149 Senator Durbin, the sponsor 
of this amendment, explained provision as follows: 
We literally give to the banks control over whether a family in 
foreclosure can go into bankruptcy. [A]nybody facing foreclosure - 
who is delinquent for at least 60 days on a home that is valued at no 
more than $729,000, with a mortgage that was written no later than 
2008 - has to show up at the bank at least 45 days before they file 
 
2009, at B1.   
147 Id.   
148 Helping Families Save Their Homes in Bankruptcy Act of 2009, supra note 45, at 38 
(written testimony of Adam J. Levitin). 
149 155 CONG. REC. S4915, 4917-4918 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 2009) (statement of Sen. Dick 
Durbin). 
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bankruptcy and present all the economic information, all the 
financial documents the bank would need for a mortgage - proof of 
income, indication of net worth. If the bank. . .offers them a 
renegotiated mortgage - a mortgage which will basically allow them 
to stay in the home. . .or offers hope for home refinancing. . .and the 
person facing foreclosure does not take that offer, then that same 
family in foreclosure cannot use the bankruptcy court to rewrite the 
mortgage. So in other words, the banks ultimately have the key to the 
courthouse.150 
Currently, federal bankruptcy judges are authorized “to modify 
debt on a vacation home, an investment property, a credit card, a car 
loan, even a yacht,”151 but not a primary residence.152 The policy behind 
the special protection for principal residences is that Congress believed, 
in 1978, that if lenders were shielded from taking a loss in bankruptcy, 
competition between lenders would result in transferring these gains to 
consumers in the form of lower loan costs, and would therefore 
encourage homeownership.153 Unfortunately, this economic belief is 
misplaced, since bankruptcy modification risk is not calculated into 
residential mortgage pricing or mortgage insurance pricing, and there is 
no noticeable effect on U.S. homeownership rates.154 In fact, bankruptcy 
is designed to give creditors at least as much as they might recover in 
foreclosure,155 so there is little reason to suggest that the mortgage 
industry would price against judicial modification through the 
bankruptcy courts. If U.S. Bankruptcy Judges are ever granted this 
additional power, mortgage servicers and lenders may make stronger 
efforts to develop modification plans because of the potential for less 
favorable judicial modification.156 Unfortunately, the Durbin 
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code were not passed, removing this 
great potential for reducing foreclosures through the judicial process. 
 
150 Id. at 4917. 
151 Id. at 4919 (statement of Sen. Jeff Merkley). 
152 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(b)(5), 1322(b)(2) (2005); Stephen Labaton, Ailing, Banks Still 
Field Strong Lobby at Capitol, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2009, at A1.   
153 155 CONG. REC. S4915, 4924 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 2009) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl); 
Adam J. Levitin, Helping Homeowners: Modification of Mortgages in Bankruptcy, 3 
H.L.P.R. ONLINE 1, 7 (2009). http://www.hlpronline.com/Levitin_HLPR_011909.pdf;  
154 Levitin, supra note 153. 
155 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5) (2005). 
156 RETOOLING HUD, supra note 7, at 17.   
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 C. The Save New Jersey Homes Act Offers More Direct Route for 
Homeowners. 
Compared to the Homes Act, which offers financial and liability-
limiting incentives for mortgage servicers, the New Jersey Act actually 
gives direct relief to homeowners with introductory rate mortgages. The 
New Jersey legislation, discussed supra, allows homeowners to extend 
their introductory rate for three additional years, instead of having a 
higher monthly payment as a result of an adjustable rate.157 Presumably, 
the New Jersey legislature believed that three years would be the 
appropriate amount of time for financially distressed homeowners to 
recover since the statute’s sunset provision causes expiration on January 
1, 2011.158 If financial recovery takes longer, however, hopefully the 
legislature will renew the statute for a longer period. Like the Homes 
Act, the New Jersey statute also protects the homeowners most in need 
of government intervention and those targeted by such introductory rate 
mortgages, by only allowing the rate extension for a property that is 
occupied by the borrower as his principal residence. 
Still, the New Jersey Act requires mortgage servicers involved 
with mortgage-backed security trusts to effectively break their contracts 
with those trusts. By engaging in mortgage modification at the behest of 
the State legislature, the income streams to investors are compromised, 
and the servicers may even be prohibited from modification by the 
pooling and servicing agreement. It will be interesting to see if New 
Jersey courts hear contract cases between servicers and investors, like 
Countrywide, and if they will decide whether the statute violates New 
Jersey common law contract principles. This is a potential weakness in 
the statute that could be remedied through the use of a bankruptcy 
amendment in the federal Homes Act, since there are no bankruptcy 
forums in the state courts. 
D. Potential Policies That May Stem the Tide. 
Consumers must make informed decisions when signing a 
mortgage, but in some low-income regions the resources of 
sophisticated financial advisors are unavailable. It is essential that all 
types of consumers be able to access helpful and accurate information 
 
157 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-40(a) (West 2008). 
158 Id. at § 46:10B-36.   
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before entering into an expensive transaction. Three avenues for reform 
should be pursued: (1) expanding public interest legal and financial 
advising firms dedicated to providing low-income communities with 
sound financial advice; (2) creating a federal Commission for Financial 
Product Safety that would serve as a resource for information and create 
regulations to ensure safety of risky financial products; and (3) 
improving the standard mortgage contract to provide for default-option 
financial planning. 
A major factor contributing to the subprime mortgage crisis was 
financial ignorance of many consumers, coupled with predatory lending 
practices. As discussed earlier, the biggest victims are often low-income 
neighborhoods comprised of minority groups.159 While banks and 
mortgage brokers must change such discriminatory lending practices, 
local community institutions may be able to provide consumer financial 
education to residents. Universities, specifically law schools and 
business schools, should offer such services free of charge, and in 
conjunction with social justice or pro bono projects. Providing such 
information about the pros and cons of different types of loans, 
explained in a simple way, will arm low-income residents with the 
knowledge necessary to make an educated financial decision. 
The second area of reform should be the creation of a dedicated 
financial products safety agency. The Federal Trade Commission’s 
Bureau of Consumer Protection states that one of its goals is to 
“protect[] consumers from deceptive and unfair practices in the 
financial services industry, including protecting consumers from 
predatory or discriminatory lending practices, as well as deceptive or 
unfair loan servicing, debt collection, and credit counseling or other 
debt assistance practices,”160 however, the Federal Trade Commission is 
already stretched thin, which is why there is a need to develop a 
separate agency. This regulatory agency would research new financial 
products to discover their short- and long-term effects, levels of risk, 
and tax consequences, and pass any regulations necessary to ensure 
consumers’ safety in purchasing such a product. As of the date of this 
Note, financial institutions still engage in risky practices, and most 
 
159 See supra note 20.   
160 About the Bureau of Consumer Protection, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/about.shtm (last visited Oct. 25, 2010).  
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proposed regulations have generally been stalled in Congress.161 Until 
forceful consumer financial product safety regulations are passed, many 
homeowners will still be at grave risk of purchasing subprime, inferior 
mortgages. 
Lastly, the mortgage industry should make improvements to the 
standard mortgage contract and create other coordinated policies that 
discourage foreclosures. The federal government, as part owner of 
several failing financial institutions and the Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac 
mortgages, should help direct the course to decreasing the national 
mortgage debt.162 These policies should include a moratorium on 
foreclosures, allowing current foreclosed property to sell and equalize 
the market. Also, there should be standardized policies for mortgage 
modifications, the possibility for reducing principal debt, or allowing 
the Treasury Department to buy out some delinquent mortgages at a 
discount price, thereby shifting losses from private investors to the 
taxpayers.163 
A true solution to the foreclosure crisis must include all types of 
initiatives that can help reduce the national mortgage debt. Private 
industry efforts, or simply waiting for a more organic housing market 
recovery, will prove to be just as fruitless as it has been since the end of 
2007. Families across the country suffering through this crisis, even 
those few that are given the chance to modify their mortgage terms, 
need effective reform. The federal government and mortgage industry 
must come up with viable solutions to help the nation get itself out of 
this costly crisis. 
CONCLUSION 
The Homes Act, as it stands, does not do enough to provide direct 
assistance to frustrated homeowners facing a slow economic recovery. 
And while banks or investors might balk at taking financial losses by 
modifying mortgages, some consumers are starting to realize they have 
another option: the voluntary default. Homeowners might choose to 
voluntarily default on their mortgage if their mortgage debt outweighs 
 
161 Alex Berenson, A Year Later, Little Change on Wall St., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2009, 
at A1.   
162 Alan M. White, Deleveraging the American Homeowner: The Failure of 2008 
Voluntary Mortgage Contract Modifications, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1107, 1129 (2009).   
163 Id. at 1130.  
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the worth of their house.164 Companies like ‘You Walk Away’ advertise 
“strategic” default plans, which include consultations with real estate 
attorneys, advice on how to avoid harassment by creditors, and 
education about the effects on a credit score.165 Mortgage modification 
plans may work for many people, especially those with jobs, but many 
who are unemployed are simply extending the period until inevitable 
foreclosure. If the long-term sustainability of a mortgage payment is 
unlikely, then even a lower payment may not be in the best financial 
interest of an individual or family. An onslaught of voluntary defaults 
might even produce beneficial economic results. There might be an 
even greater incentive to make effective home mortgage modifications 
if a wave of voluntary foreclosures strikes fear into the hearts of 
banking institutions.166 
Bankruptcy provisions would effectively produce a similar result 
of encouraging meaningful mortgage modification plans for 
homeowners. The potential for more significant losses through judicial 
modification would likely encourage mortgage servicers and lenders to 
make greater strides in developing modification plans for distressed 
homeowners. In a world of judicially imposed mortgage modification, 
however, there could be the potential for including the cost of 
bankruptcy modification into future mortgage lending. Such increased 
lending costs might not be a bad thing, and may likely have the effect of 
home mortgage lending only to those who can truly afford it. 
 
 
164 Eric Weiner, Why Not Just Walk Away from a Home?, NPR (Feb. 13, 2008), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=18958049.   
165 YOU WALK AWAY, http://www.youwalkaway.com (last visited Oct. 25, 2010).   
166 Roger Lowenstein, Walk Away From Your Mortgage!, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2010, at 
MM15.   
